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GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
GEORGE HAY,* JOHN C. HILKE,**& PHILIP B. NELSON***
I. INTRODUCTION
Market definition is generally regarded as a key step in antitrust
analysis. Market definition has two components. Product market defini-
tion seeks to include all products that are meaningful substitutes. Geo-
graphic market definition seeks to incorporate all relevant sources of the
product in question. This paper is concerned with geographic market
definition and, in particular, how geographic markets are defined in situ-
ations where competition may, at least to some extent, transcend national
boundaries.
The subject of the paper may be of some current interest for two
reasons. First, the perception is widespread that, over the past twenty or
so years, competition in many products and services has become increas-
ingly international in scope and that this trend will continue. Second, the
way in which foreign competition is taken into account in performing the
antitrust analysis can have a dramatic impact on the legal or policy con-
clusions that are reached in a particular instance. The legality of a pro-
posed merger, for example, may turn entirely on how competition from
foreign sellers is treated.'
For antitrust purposes, when we say that competition has become
more international in scope, we mean primarily that the range of possible
suppliers for many goods and services to U.S. consumers increasingly
includes sellers who do not produce or are not primarily headquartered
in the United States or that an increasing portion of sales by American-
based firms are to customers abroad. 2 Many aspects of antitrust are po-
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1. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust Implications of Domestic Mergers: A Proposalfor the Treatment of
Imports and Its Application to LTV-Republic, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667 (1985).
2. The internationalization of markets may not be completely symmetric. Many American
producers complain that while foreign suppliers are welcomed in U.S. markets, American suppliers
have a difficult time breaking into foreign markets for reasons having little to do with the price or
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tentially affected by these changes.3 Some of the more complex issues
involve "jurisdictional considerations" and these will not be discussed
here. 4 As we will see, however, the subject of market definition exposes
almost all of the substantive (as opposed to jurisdictional) considerations
that come into play when we take account of the international aspect of
certain markets.I
The paper has three main parts. The first focuses on the role market
definition plays in antitrust analysis and, in particular, the link between
market definition and market power. The second explores the particular
issues that are raised with respect to market definition when there is an
international aspect to competition. The final section addresses some of
the empirical questions raised by the largely theoretical analysis of the
first two parts of the paper.
II. MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER
To understand the role of market definition, and geographic market
definition in particular, some context is helpful. Modern antitrust analy-
sis usually contains two main steps. First we assess the degree of so-
called "market power," which represents the potential for competitive
harm; then we analyze the competitive consequences of certain specific
conduct that has been brought to our attention.
6
quality of American goods. The evidence supporting this complaint, perhaps unavoidably, is largely
anecdotal.
3. Large chunks of antitrust "activity" continue to involve products and services that are very
local in character. To confirm this phenomenon, one need only peruse the press releases of the
Justice Department announcing the filing of new antitrust cases.
4. For a nice summary of these issues and the way the Justice Department recommends they
be handled, see the recently issued Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg.
21,584 (1988) (proposed June 8, 1988).
5. It should be acknowledged that, while the influence of foreign suppliers is perhaps quantita-
tively more significant than it has been in this country's recent past, foreign competition is not
unique to the 1980s. Hence, it should come as no surprise that many of the issues being discussed in
antitrust circles today have been subjects of discussion for much of the life of our antitrust laws, with
some of the important, and still relevant, decisions dating back more than fifty years. See, for exam-
ple, the discussion of foreign competition in Judge Hand's famous Alcoa opinion. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
6. Certain categories of conduct are regarded as illegal per se, and will be condemned without
any showing of individual or collective market power. Horizontal price fixing is the classic example.
Traditionally, we have regarded price fixing as so inherently anticompetitive (and so lacking in off-
setting benefit) that we condemn it irrespective of the degree of market power held by the price-
fixers. When conduct falls in the category of a per se violation, the result is that once the conduct
has been established, there is no successful defense, including the defense of no market power. There
is a bit of a contradiction here since, if there is really no market power, and therefore no potential for
competitive harm, it is difficult to see how the conduct can be seen as inherently anticompetitive.
One answer is that we recognize the imperfection of our market power analysis; i.e., it is possible to
make a mistake and conclude there is no market power when in fact there is. (Indeed the behavior of
the parties in seeking to fix prices suggests that they think there is some potential for extracting
higher prices from consumers.) Since we cannot think of any redeeming virtue for the conduct, the
[Vol. 64:711
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We do the analysis in two steps to save ourselves some effort. If we
find that the structure of the market is such that there is little potential
for competitive harm (because competition is too intense), we can choose
not to bother with the second step and let firms behave as they please
without worrying about any possible anticompetitive consequences since
the presence of effective competition provides a powerful antidote for ef-
forts by firms to exploit consumers.7  Firms that set prices too high, or
impose unwanted conditions on the sale of their products (like tie-ins), or
who seek to insulate dealers of their product from competition with one
another, will lose out to rivals who behave more in keeping with the
consumer interest.
8
This two-step approach has long been the norm in monopolization
cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 9 where a firm cannot be found
liable for monopolization unless it has monopoly power (or at least there
is a dangerous probability of obtaining it). It is also employed in merger
cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act' ° where, unless the industry
displays a structure conducive to the exercise of market power, the
merger will not be challenged.II More recently it has become the prac-
tice to evaluate most claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as well
using this two-step process. In the case of vertical nonprice restraints,
prudent approach is to condemn it all the time. However, for conduct which is not inherently
anticompetitive and has some significant potential for creating efficiencies, condemning it all the time
is unlikely to be a sensible policy prescription. For a recent case in which the possible tradeoff
between blanket condemnation and preliminary market power analysis is discussed in some detail,
see Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. F.T.C., 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
7. This should not be taken to mean that it is improper to examine firm conduct for evidence
that a firm has market power. For a discussion of the problems that arise when firm conduct is
ignored in reaching a determination about the presence of market power, see Hilke & Nelson, Non-
price Predation and Attempted Monopolization: The Coffee (General Foods) Case, in THE ANTI-
TRUST REVOLUTION 208 (J. Kwoka & L. White eds. 1989).
8. A second factor is that the absence of market power may allow us to infer something about
the possible social benefits of conduct without the need fully to evaluate or understand the conduct.
If the firms cannot expect to earn monopoly profits from their activities (because they do not enjoy
any market power), it may be reasonable to presume that the purpose of the conduct is to achieve
some efficiencies. Hence, for example, vertical nonprice restraints instituted by manufacturers with-
out market power may safely be assumed to be motivated by a desire to encourage dealers to provide
certain presale services valued by the consumer rather than an effort to extract (or allow dealers to
extract) supracompetitive profits. But even if we are wrong about the manufacturer's motive, we
need not worry because interbrand competition will prevent the manufacturer from getting away
with his misconceived scheme to bilk consumers.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
10. Id. § 18.
11. In merger analysis, the second step is often implicit. Since a merger will almost certainly
eliminate competition between the merging firms, the merger is normally presumed to be anticompe-
titive if the first step shows a significant potential for anticompetitive harm. Only recently has the
Department of Justice begun to consider the possible efficiency gains from a horizontal merger as an
offset to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26.834
(issued June 14, 1984).
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for example, courts are increasingly asserting that, absent a showing of
market power, the restraint will be held lawful.12
Since market power plays such a key role in antitrust analysis, it is
necessary to have both a proper conceptual understanding and a worka-
ble empirical means of identifying market power."a The first of these is
relatively straightforward. At the conceptual level, market power can be
defined as the ability of a firm or group of firms profitably to raise prices
significantly above competitive levels for a sustained period.' 4 (Hence-
forth we will speak primarily in terms of individual market power to
make the discussion simpler, but the extrapolation to collective market
power for purposes of considering conduct by several firms in concert is
straightforward.) This definition is fully consistent with a consumer wel-
fare orientation for antitrust. The concern with certain business arrange-
ments is that they may directly or indirectly enable a firm to extract
higher prices from consumers. If the market structure is sufficiently
competitive that there is little danger of consumers being gouged, then
there is little to fear from the business conduct under examination.
As for the second step, the tradition in antitrust analysis has been to
associate market power with a large market share. For example, market
share plays a prominent role in all the classic judicial opinions in Section
2 monopoly cases, 15 and is increasingly used in Section 1 cases as an
indicator of market power.' 6 This tradition of associating market power
12. For a good discussion of origin and application of the two-step process in Section 1 cases,
see Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87. Power and Access (Part I), 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 275, 276-
301 (1987). Ironically, vertical price restraints are still regarded as unlawful per se. Since price and
nonprice restraints are often difficult to distinguish, the disparate treatment has resulted in consider-
able confusion. See Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 418 (1985).
13. There is an intriguing and potentially important issue of whether there is any distinction
between "market power" and "monopoly power." The terms are often used interchangeably by
economists and judges, yet an argument can be made that market power represents (or should repre-
sent) a lesser degree of power than monopoly power since a requirement of establishing monopoly
power in Sherman Act Section 1 cases would make Section 2 of the Sherman Act virtually superflu-
ous. For more on this esoteric but important issue, see Briggs & Calkins, supra note 12.
14. This particular definition has become more or less the standard among academic commen-
tators and antitrust practitioners since it was set out in the Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493
(1982) (issued June 14, 1982) (preceding the 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11). Courts, on the
other hand, have not always been very uniform or very precise in the definition they employ in
writing opinions. See Briggs & Calkins, supra note 12. The emphasis on the word "profitably" is
deliberate. Any firm, even one with many competitors, can raise the price and maintain the high
price indefinitely, but the firm facing a lot of competition will lose money in the process.
15. Perhaps the most prominent example is Judge Hand's opinion in the Alcoa case, where he
opined on the minimum market share needed to establish monopoly power. United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
16. See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 624 F. Supp. 411, 413 (D.S.D. 1985) (a
plaintiff challenging a vertical territorial restriction must show, at the threshold, the absence of sub-




with large market shares is what creates the need for market definition.
In order to measure market share we need to know the answer to the
question "market share of what?" That is what market definition, in-
cluding the definition of geographic markets, is supposed to help us find
out.' 7 Defining markets is deciding which firms get counted (and how
they get counted) when doing the arithmetic computation of market
shares. '8
Since the purpose of defining markets is to enable the factfinder to
reach an inference as to the existence of market power, markets should
be defined in such a way that, when market shares are computed, they
provide as reliable an index as possible to the degree of market power
present.' 9 Markets that are defined too narrowly will typically result in
market shares that overstate the degree of market power present by ig-
noring important sources of competition. Markets that are defined too
broadly will typically understate the degree of market power by includ-
ing in the market share calculations sources of competition that are dis-
tinctly inferior as a threat to the exercise of market power.
20
As we will discuss, the risk of defining markets too narrowly or too
broadly is likely to be especially serious when the issue is whether foreign
sources of competition are realistic alternatives for American consumers.
However, in order to appreciate the complexities associated with defining
markets so as to account properly for foreign sources of supply, it is im-
portant to recognize that, even in the best of worlds, the link between
market share and market power is somewhat indirect.
Market share, as we usually think of it, is historical or backward-
17. As Landes and Posner have argued, it may be possible to measure the degree of market
power directly without reference to any specifically defined market or market share. However, the
data with which to perform such measurements may be difficult to obtain or be subject to ambiguous
explanations. Thus, analysts have typically turned to more indirect ways of assessing power. See
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).
18. Market definition has both a product and a geographic dimension. It matters for purposes
of measuring Coca-Cola's market share whether we are limiting the market (i.e., the denominator
which will be divided into Coca-Cola's sales) to cola-flavored soft drinks or to all carbonated non-
alcoholic beverages. (In this example, market definition can also affect the numerator. If Coca-Cola
sells non-cola-flavored carbonated soft drinks, its own sales, the numerator, as well as the denomina-
tor will be affected by expanding the market.) It matters for purposes of measuring U.S. Steel's
market share of a particular steel product whether we are considering only sales made in the United
States, or are including in the denominator sales by steel companies anywhere in the world.
19. Landes and Posner have observed that, at least in principle, it ought to be possible to assess
the degree of market power without bothering with market definition (and hence without using
market shares). Data availability problems, however, may necessitate the use of more indirect meas-
ures of market power, such as market share. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 952-53.
20. In rare cases, an excessively narrow definition may result in understating market power and
vice versa. For example, an overly broad definition may artificially inflate a firm's market share by
including the firm's sales of a related product when that related product is not in fact an effective
substitute for the product under consideration.
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looking; it tells us the relative sales success of a firm and its rivals last
month or last year, a period when competitive conditions may have pre-
vailed.21 On the other hand, the concept of market power is dynamic, or
forward-looking. The degree of market power enjoyed by a firm depends
on how much business it will lose to its rivals if it attempts to raise price
above competitive levels. The traditional link between market power and
market share is based on the assumption that, if a firm had a large share
of the market before initiating a noncompetitive increase, it will retain
much of that business afterwards, i.e., that rivals will not take away
enough business to make the price increase unprofitable. 22 However,
there may be many circumstances in which this working assumption will
not be satisfied 'and (historically) small rivals would be fully capable of
rapidly expanding output and attracting additional customers from the
firm that initiated the price increase. In such a case, historical market
shares would tell us nothing about market power.
23
The purpose in exposing these limitations on the inferences to be
drawn from market share is to lay the groundwork for the introduction
of foreign competition. Our goal cannot be to define markets so that
market shares are a perfect proxy for market power. Rather, the more
modest objective is to treat foreign sources of competition in such a way
that market shares are no less valid a proxy for market power than they
would be in a purely domestic context.
21. It is of course possible that, in the base year for measuring market shares, the firm with
90% of the market was already charging a price that exceeded the competitive level. Hence, the firm
enjoys monopoly power even if it could not profitably raise prices any further. Where we can actu-
ally observe and detect supracompetitive pricing, the need for inferences based on market share is
obviated.
22. This assumption is, in turn, supported by the intuitive notion that there is a natural limit to
the degree to which rivals are capable of expanding output. Hence, if a firm starts out with a- large
share (e.g., 80%), even a doubling of the rivals' collective sales would still leave it with a large
enough volume of sales that the price increase will have proved profitable. If, on the other hand, the
firm initiating the increase starts out with only 20% of the market, even a modest percentage in-
crease in output on the part of rivals collectively will result in a substantial loss of sales, enough that
the higher price on the retained sales probably will not compensate for the foregone revenue from the
sales that are lost.
23. The degree of market power will also be affected by the availability of good substitutes for
the product in question. The tradition in antitrust has been to evaluate the "goodness" of substitu-
tion on an either/or basis. If there are good substitutes, the market is redefined to include those
substitutes. Otherwise, the market is defined narrowly, and it is presumed that a firm with a large
share of the market as defined has "market power." How good the degree of substitutability has to
be to cause the substitutes to be included in the market is not always specified with precision. The
1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (and the 1984 revised version) reverse the process,
and state that the market will be defined narrowly if a firm with a large share (e.g., 100%) is suffi-
ciently insulated from substitutes that it can profitably raise price significantly above the competitive
level. Of course, before one can use this rule to decide how to define markets, one needs to know
what is meant by "significantly." The tradition since publication of the Merger Guidelines has been
to think in terms of a 5% or 10% increase in price as the benchmark.
[Vol. 64:711
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III. MARKET POWER AND FOREIGN COMPETITION
A. How Foreign Competition Can Limit Domestic Market Power
Under the U.S. antitrust laws, the issue of foreign competition typi-
cally arises when it is claimed that competition from foreign producers
limits the market power of domestic firms. 24 This can happen in several
ways.
At least in principle, foreign producers can affect the market power
of domestic firms even where foreign producers make no sales in the U.S.
and, for whatever reason, are unlikely to do so even if the price in the
U.S. were to be elevated above competitive levels. For this to occur re-
quires that domestic producers sell in foreign markets where they com-
pete against foreign producers, and that the following two conditions be
met:
1. Sales in foreign markets are a significant percentage of total sales
for U.S. producers.
2. U.S. producers cannot discriminate in price between foreign and
domestic sales; i.e., they must charge the same price (net of transporta-
tion charges) in the U.S. as they charge for sales to foreign consumers.
(This condition is more likely to be fulfilled when there are good oppor-
tunities for arbitrage, e.g., some intermediary buys goods intended for
export to foreign markets and redirects them to the U.S. market. 25 This
arbitrage will frustrate the efforts of U.S. sellers to charge higher prices
to U.S. consumers.)
Where both of these conditions are satisfied, U.S. producers, who
would then be faced with the choice of selling to both sets of consumers
(U.S. and foreign) at a price which reflects the competition they face
against foreign firms, or abandoning foreign sales and selling only in the
U.S., where they can take advantage of the more limited competition, are
more likely to choose the former.26 Mechanically, the way this situation
would be analyzed under the market share approach to assessing market
power would be to define the market as international (even though the
24. Obviously, there may be special circumstances when the producer with market power is
itself a foreign firm. It will be straightforward to extend the analysis presented in the text to cover
that situation.
25. In the case of branded consumer products, arbitrage may be limited by the U.S. Customs
policy of preventing "unauthorized" entry of goods bearing a trademark owned by a U.S. firm. An
exception to this policy is allowed when the U.S. trademark holder is owned by a foreign firm. For a
discussion, see Hilke, Free-Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the Theories and Available
Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 75 (1988).
26. For a more precise (but more complex) explanation and a mathematical proof of the impact




focus of interest is on U.S. consumes),27 and to count all the sales of
foreign producers and both the domestic and foreign sales of U.S. produ-
cers. The apparent high shares of domestic producers (vis-A-vis domestic
consumers) would evaporate as the market was expanded, and the (pre-
sumably) much lower degree of concentration in overall sales would pro-
vide an accurate picture of the state of competition. Hence, while U.S.
consumers are genuinely without competitive options, U.S. producers
would not find it profitable to take advantage of their vulnerability.
28 If
this approach is to be followed, a rule is needed to decide when sales of
U.S. producers in foreign markets are "enough" so that the first condi-
tion is satisfied.
However, the most obvious way that foreign firms can limit the mar-
ket power of domestic firms is when foreign firms actually sell some or all
of their output in the U.S. in direct competition with domestic firms, or
at least are prepared to do so if the price in the U.S. rises above the
competitive level. In these circumstances, one might attempt to incorpo-
rate the competitive effect of the foreign suppliers simply by defining the
geographic market as the U.S. and, where the foreign firm has a record of
actual sales, to include those historical sales in the market share calcula-
tions just as if the firm were domestic. 29 For example, in the case of a
foreign firm which had actual sales in the U.S. equal to 5% of total U.S.
sales in the time period for which data are available, the foreign firm
would be given the same weight as a domestic seller which also had 5%
of the market.
Our earlier discussion of the meaning of market shares makes it
clear why this approach may not be satisfactory. Keeping in mind the
27. When we indicate that a market is "international" we do not necessarily mean that all
foreign producers are in the same market as U.S. producers. We only mean that some foreign pro-
ducers must be recognized as effective competitors of U.S. firms. For example, tariff barriers that
insulate foreign producers from competition may allow inefficient foreign producers to survive.
These inefficient foreign firms will have no impact on U.S. prices and thus are not in the relevant
market.
28. These conditions seem somewhat esoteric, but the reader will recognize that an analytically
similar phenomenon is routinely experienced in the context of defining product markets. The fact
that some consumers would not change to an alternative brand of cigarettes even at substantially
higher prices ("I'd walk a mile for a Camel!") does not give the manufacturer of that brand any
exploitable monopoly power if most of that producer's customers are prepared to switch as soon as
prices are raised above competitive levels.
29. Where a firm has made no sales in the U.S. (even though it might have substantial world-
wide capacity and may have been a significant seller in other parts of the world), it would be ignored
in calculating U.S. market shares (as would a potential competitor based in the U.S.) and, therefore,
would not be directly taken into account in assessing the market power of domestic firms. Just as
potential domestic competition, e.g., new entry, can be tacked on to the market share-based analysis,
so too could the foreign firm with significant capacity be taken into account as an "extra" factor, and
serve to modify the conclusions that were tentatively drawn from the market share analysis.
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forward-looking meaning of market power (what will happen if a firm
attempts to raise price above the competitive level), the interpretation we
are implicitly adopting is that the foreign firm with historical sales ac-
counting for 5% of the U.S. market represents the same threat to the
dominant firm attempting to exercise market power as the domestic firm
with a 5% share.
This interpretation may understate the competitive threat posed by
the foreign firm. The domestic firm with 5% of the market may try to
expand sales somewhat at the expense of its larger rival who has initiated
the noncompetitive increase, but there are likely to be limits on the
amount of additional output that can be expected due to the difficulty of
economically expanding production capacity in a short amount of time
or some other constraint.
However, an important distinction between the foreign firm with
5% of U.S. sales and its domestic counterpart is that, in most instances,
the foreign firm will not be devoting all its production capacity to serve
the U.S. market. 30 If prices in the U.S. rise, it is possible for the foreign
firm, without increasing total output, to reorient its distribution pattern
and ship a larger percentage of its total production to the U.S. Hence,
unlike the "typical" domestic rival, the foreign firm need not depend on
increasing production to increase sales in the U.S. and hence is likely to
be able to respond not only more quickly but also with greater quantity.
If so, the foreign firm is more of a threat than the domestic firm with the
same historical "market share" and conclusions about market power
based on historical market shares are subject to error to a greater degree
than is anticipated in the situation where competition is limited to do-
mestic firms.
It might be argued that, in other respects, a foreign firm is at a dis-
advantage relative to the domestic firm with comparable U.S. sales, due
to the possibility of transportation costs, tariffs, or other trade barriers.
However, at least in the first example we used above, where the foreign
firm has actually made some sales in the U.S., it must have overcome
those barriers in order to penetrate the U.S. in the first place. (Perhaps
the foreign firm's manufacturing costs at home are low enough to com-
pensate for any disadvantages, or the foreign firm has some other offset-
30. The fact that foreign supply is being imported into the U.S. suggests that it is unlikely that
much U.S. production is being exported (unless transportation costs are trivial or structured so that
imports are flowing into one part of the U.S. while exports are flowing out of another part of the
U.S.). If products are defined properly, two-way trade flows of the identical product are the excep-
tion, not the rule. Hence it is unlikely that the typical domestic firm has the capacity to increase
sales in the U.S. by redirecting production that is currently going elsewhere. A finding of two-way
trade suggests the need for a tighter production market definition.
1988]
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ting advantage.) Hence, these trade barriers should not be an obstacle to
the firm's making additional sales in response to the higher domestic
price.31 Indeed, even where the foreign firm has not penetrated the U.S.
market at all, while it is certainly possible that such barriers are substan-
tial enough to keep out foreign supply even if prices in the U.S. are
raised, it is also possible that imports were just marginally unprofitable at
competitive prices and a noncompetitive price increase would be enough
to cause large diversions to the U.S. market.
B. How Traditional Merger Analysis Accounts for Foreign Competition
Where it is clear that, because of the threat of foreign competition,
domestic market shares provide a seriously misleading picture of the de-
gree of market power, the traditional solution has been to redefine the
market to make it broader than the U.S. (e.g., all North America, North
America and Europe, the entire non-Communist world, the entire world,
etc.). Market shares are then be measured based on sales everywhere in
this broader market and the usual inferences about market power
drawn. 32 Much of the literature on geographic market definition has
been concerned with deciding when the geographic market should be ex-
panded beyond the U.S.33 The analytical tests that have been suggested
fall primarily into three categories. 34
31. Quotas make for an exceptional case. Where the foreign firm is subject to a quota expressed
in terms of a specific volume of shipments, and the firm is already at the ceiling permitted under the
quota, then no additional imports will be forthcoming regardless of the higher price. Where the
foreign firm is under a percentage quota, where the level of permissible imports is expressed as a
percent of domestic output or consumption, the situation is perverse. As the domestic price rises,
domestic production and consumption will decline, requiring a concomitant decline in the amount of
allowable imports. In this case, the foreign firm would represent less of a threat to the market power
of a domestic firm than would a domestic rival with the same historical market share so long as the
quotas remain in effect.
The dynamics of other trade restrictions may cause them to resemble quotas. It is often ob-
served that pressure to increase trade protection and more vigorously enforce current restrictions
increases with the volume of imports. If so, other restrictions will resemble quotas in their effect.
32. Implicit in this approach is the expectation that all consumers in the market as defined, not
merely consumers in the U.S., would be the potential victims of a noncompetitive increase. This is
not inconsistent with the focus of concern being consumers in the U.S.
This approach may lead to incorrect conclusions when some foreign producers can not influ-
ence U.S. pricing. For example, it may be that Japanese firms are insulated from foreign competition
by a tariff. Thus, some inefficient Japanese firms may survive, (perhaps because of high Japanese
prices set by a dominant firm). These inefficient Japanese firms will not affect U.S. pricing in any
significant way, even if there is a relatively efficient Japanese firm that could compete for U.S. sales at
higher U.S. prices.
33. For an excellent discussion of these issues, and a more detailed survey of the relevant litera-
ture see Dobson, Breen & Hurdle, Geographic Market Definition: A Review of Theory and Method for
Domestic and International Markets, 14 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & EcON. 937 (1984) (an
undated Federal Trade Commission paper). Some of what follows is drawn from that paper as well
as from the specific sources discussed or cited in that paper.
34. The tests are not mutually exclusive. The 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines,
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1. Analysis of Possible Barriers to Imports
The first is an evaluation of the factors that are (or at least ought to
be) important in determining whether foreign firms can compete on a
more-or-less even footing in the U.S. The factors that tend to be empha-
sized are those which might operate as barriers to effective competition
by foreign firms, especially trade barriers-tariffs or quotas--or high
transportation costs. A finding that there are significant barriers to
trade, such as high transportation costs, is used to support a narrow defi-
nition of the market."
a
However, while an attempt to identify possible barriers to free trade
is undoubtedly a useful undertaking, there is a danger in relying entirely
on the findings of such an inquiry. For one thing, a failure to find any
significant barriers may not mean that none exist, but simply that they do
not fall in the usual categories. Recently, for example, it has been argued
that the real barriers to effective participation of U.S. firms in Japanese
domestic markets are not formal tariffs or quotas (and not transportation
costs) but various regulatory restrictions that seem to operate dispropor-
tionately against American products. In the U.S., buyer preferences may
operate in favor of domestic suppliers for a variety of reasons ranging
from patriotism to concern about assurance of supply.
On the other side of the coin, for reasons discussed above and with
the possible exception of quotas,3 6 a finding of high tariffs or transporta-
tion costs does not necessarily mean that foreign sellers are not viable
competitors in the U.S. since these disadvantages could be offset by lower
manufacturing costs. This possibility becomes less remote when we re-
call that the issue is whether foreign firms would be viable as sellers to
U.S. consumers if domestic firms raised prices above the competitive
level. As discussed above, tariffs or transportation costs may make ex-
porting to the U.S. marginally uneconomic at competitive prices, but ex-
ports would be profitable if the price in the U.S. were to increase by any
significant amount.
for example, indicate that the Department will consider all the kinds of evidence discussed below in
deciding when to expand the geographic market, without being specific about how it will utilize any
given data. The Guidelines very clearly reflect, however, the inadequacy of historical market shares
as a guide to market power, and the need to examine what foreign sellers could achieve if domestic
producers were to raise prices.
35. Areeda and Turner indicate that transportation costs, buyer convenience, and localized
buyer preferences for the products of particular sellers are the primary factors that might limit the
ability of some firms to sell in particular geographic areas. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 358-67 (1978).
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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2. Correlation of Prices
A second approach to identifying geographic markets compares
prices in the U.S. to those in the rest of the geographic area being consid-
ered for inclusion in the market. If the two regions are really part of a
single market, one might expect prices in the two regions to tend toward
equality, since if prices are higher in one region than another, product
will move from the high price to the low price region until prices are
equalized.
3 7
In fact, under most circumstances, prices in the two regions do not
have to be equal so long as they move in parallel. For example, the price
of crude oil at the Persian Gulf might be $20 a barrel, and the price of
domestic crude oil $22 a barrel. But if transport costs between the re-
gions are only about $2 a barrel, a price increase in the United States will
create an incentive to import Middle Eastern crude until the price differ-
ential returns to $2. Arabian antitrust authorities concerned about cus-
tomers for crude oil in the Middle East might not regard American crude
producers as exercising any competitive restraint on the pricing of Per-
sian Gulf crude,38 but from an American perspective the relevant market
can be extended to include the Persian Gulf since American producers
lack the power profitably to raise prices above $22.
While it is possible for there to be high correlation between prices
without a single market being indicated, 39 commentators are prepared, in
principle, to presume a single market based on the price data.4° The
main problem with this test seems to be a practical one-the difficulty of
obtaining the data adequate to perform the correlation analysis.
41
37. One of the more prominent advocates of this approach is Ira Horowitz. See Horowitz,
Market Definition in Antitrust Analysis.- A Regression-Based Approach, 48 S. EcON. J. 1 (1981). It is
also endorsed by Areeda and Turner in their treatise. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
35, at 355-58 (price relationships ire clearly the best single guide to geographic market definition).
It may be easier and more useful to take the opposite perspective, i.e., using price differences or
independence in price movements as evidence that areas are not in the same geographic area. See
Hilke & Nelson, supra note 7, at 212.
38. Although, as discussed above, if a significant percent of Persian Gulf crude oil is exported
to the U.S., and price discrimination is not feasible, Persian Gulf producers will price at home as
though they were competing against U.S. producers.
39. Such a correlation may be completely spurious, or the result of prices in both areas being
driven by a common third factor, e.g., input costs. Obviously, the longer the period of high correla-
tion, the less likely the correlation is not a genuine indicator of a single market.
40. See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 355-57. For a criticism of the use
of price correlation as a means of market definition, see J. BAKER, WHY PRICE CORRELATIONS Do
NOT DEFINE ANTITRUST MARKETS: ON ECONOMETRIC ALGORITHMS FOR MARKET DEFINITION
(U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 149, 1987).
41. See, e.g., Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger
Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45, 49-50 (1973).
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3. Analysis of Actual Shipments into the U.S.
The third, and most frequently mentioned, approach to deciding
when to expand the geographic market beyond the U.S. involves an anal-
ysis of shipments. The basic idea is that if shipments into the U.S. have
been significant over time, then it is safe to presume that any barriers to
product flow (at least in the direction relevant for the inquiry) have been
overcome and the market is properly redefined to include the source of
the shipments. 42 The precise level of shipments needed to satisfy the test
is naturally somewhat arbitrary. The most prominently mentioned test,
proposed by Elzinga and Hogarty with special reference to defining geo-
graphic submarkets within the U.S., originally referred to a 25% thresh-
old but the figure was subsequently revised to 10%. 4 3 That is, if 25% of
the sales to consumers in the U.S. are from producers outside the U.S.,
the market has been defined too narrowly and must be expanded to in-
corporate the source of the foreign supply.44
While there may be exceptions, 4 5 the presumption created by a find-
ing of significant imports is a strong one. Moreover, proponents of the
test would claim that data availability is likely to be far less serious of a
problem for shipments than for price, for example.46 One criticism of the
shipments-based test is that, used in isolation, it is too conservative. The
test will tend to define the U.S. as a separate geographic market based on
a low level of imports in the past, even in cases where an increase in the
domestic price above the competitive level could not be sustained because
42. Areeda and Turner are particularly critical of the use of shipments data to infer geographic
markets. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 357 ("Although actual sales patterns can
aid in the interpretation of ambiguous price data or otherwise illuminate the geographic character of
a market, we should be aware that actual patterns can be virtually meaningless.").
43. Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 41, at 74. The revision of the threshold is suggested in
Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23
ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978). This is referred to as the LIFO (little in from outside) test. There is a
parallel LOFI (little out from inside) test aimed at identifying the case where the price of domestic
producers is determined by the competition they face in their export markets. For a discussion of
some of the possible technical problems with the Elzinga-Hogarty test, see Werden, The Use and
Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining Geographic Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 739 (1981)
(exchange between Professors Elzinga and Werden).
44. There is a potentially serious ambiguity in this test when the foreign supply comes from two
or more geographic regions. Suppose, for example, that 24% of U.S. consumption of a product
originates in Germany, and 2% originates in Japan. Does the Elzinga-Hogarty test instruct us to
include neither region in the market (because neither accounts for 25%), both regions (because the
total exceeds 25%), or only Germany? Expanding the market to include Japan may result in seri-
ously overstating the threat to U.S. producers from producers in Japan if the few Japanese imports
can be explained by special circumstances. It is precisely the concern about such special circum-
stances, after all, that caused Elzinga and Hogarty to decline to expand the market when total im-
ports account for only a few percent of domestic consumption.
45. See Dobson, Breen & Hurdle, supra note 33, at 954-55.
46. Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 41, at 75-76.
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imports would enter the U.S. at prices only slightly higher than current
and recently prevailing levels.
Another criticism is that in some circumstances the shipments-based
test is too permissive. In particular, if products are not strictly homoge-
neous, the presence of imports may have little to do with the status of
domestic firms' market power. Further, when production is geographi-
cally concentrated, shipments tests are prone to exaggerating the extent
of the market.
47
C. Attempts to Move Beyond the Traditional Approach
1. The Landes-Posner Assessment of Foreign Competition
Recognizing the pitfalls in the use of shipments data, William
Landes and Richard Posner have attempted to build on the basic intui-
tion of the shipments approach, but have modified the test dramatically
in order to reflect the potentially large difference between a foreign pro-
ducer's historical sales in the U.S. and its true threat to the market power
of a domestic producer.48 They recommend that, "if a distant seller has
some sales in a local market, all its sales, wherever made, should be con-
sidered a part of that local market for purposes of computing the market
share of a local seller."' 49 For U.S. industries characterized by interna-
tional product flows, Landes and Posner's approach requires the inclu-
sion of all foreign production by a manufacturer as part of the U.S.
market if that manufacturer sells any products in the U.S.
Underlying the Landes and Posner argument is the intuitive idea
that it is easy for a foreign producer to divert some of the output he
currently sells abroad to the U.S. if prices in the U.S. rise relative to
foreign prices. 50 In particular, Landes and Posner believe that if foreign
47. Werden, supra note 43.
48. Landes & Posner, supra note 17. For elaboration and criticism of the Landes and Posner
approach, see Brennan, Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1982);
Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1817 (1982); Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1789
(1982).
49. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 963.
50. In Landes and Posner's own words:
The formal analysis that leads to this result is somewhat complicated, and hence relegated
to the Appendix. It involves showing that the supply response of the competitive fringe
(here consisting of the distant sellers that have some sales in the local market in question) is
an increasing function of the ratio of the distant sellers' sales in their other markets to their
sales in the local market. The higher the ratio, the higher their supply response will be,
because it is easier for distant sellers to divert a small fraction of their output to the local





firms "can sell one unit of the product in the domestic market, they
ought to be able to sell many units there at no appreciably higher cost,
since they have only to divert output from other markets."' 5 1 They also
conclude that, "if the domestic producer cannot keep foreign production
out, then he cannot raise price without being inundated by such
production.
'52
Landes and Posner justify the inclusion of all the foreign producer's
output in the U.S. market by arguing that the size of the foreign pro-
ducer's output "relative to the size of the local market indicates the prob-
able ease with which they [foreign producers] can expand their output in
the local market without incurring substantially higher costs of produc-
tion."' 53 Moreover, they extend this argument by indicating that it would
be correct to include all the foreign producer's capacity, not just its his-
torical sales. 54 In their view, "[u]nused capacity implies a high supply
elasticity of the competitive fringe because such capacity can be brought
into production promptly and with no increase in production costs;
hence it is an effective constraint on the pricing of the local seller." '55
Landes and Posner extend their analysis in one other way, based on
their examination of the implications of the presence of exports (e.g., ex-
ports by U.S. firms). They conclude that, if there are exports, then it is
appropriate to include the production of foreign firms that are in compe-
tition with these exports in the foreign market, as well as the exports
themselves. 56 They base this conclusion on the notion that foreign pro-
duction that competes with a U.S. firm's exports constrains the ability of
the U.S. firm to raise prices because an effort to raise prices would lead to
higher prices at home and abroad. The higher foreign prices would lead
foreign producers to increase supply, "which would in turn induce [the
U.S. firm] to divert supply to its domestic market, thereby reducing price
in that market."'
57
While Landes and Posner recognize that their approach is not flaw-
less,5 8 they nonetheless strongly advocate its application. Indeed, they





56. In Landes and Posner's words:
One can show that to derive the domestic firm's demand elasticity and hence its market
power, (1) its exports and the production of foreign firms (provided the domestic firm sells
in their markets) should be included in the denominator of the market share calculation,
and (2) the domestic firm's exports should be part of the numerator of this calculation.
Id. at 968.
57. Id.
58. Landes and Posner explicitly address two problems with their approach. First, they recog-
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suggest only three qualifications that should be made when applying it.
First, they require that the product be a homogeneous product,59 since
the presence of product differentiation might make it optimal for a do-
mestic monopolist to set a price that allowed some imports. 6° Second,
they suggest that the foreign supplier should have had nonnegligible sales
in the U.S. for a continuous period of several years.6' Third, they require
evidence that the product reaches more than the U.S. coast, since it is
conceivable that transportation costs insulate the interior markets or the
other coast.
62
Landes and Posner conclude that their approach may still be overly
conservative. In particular, they believe that, to the extent their analysis
will make a mistake, it will be a mistake along the lines of concluding
that the U.S. is a relevant market when the correct market is broader.
The reason for this, as they point out, is that the absence of imports
today does not necessarily mean that imports will not materialize if U.S.
prices rise above competitive levels.
63
2. Comments on the Landes-Posner Approach
Underlying Landes and Posner's. analysis is a formal economic
model which assumes that the relevant market is characterized by the
presence of a large firm with monopoly power, a U.S.-based competitive
fringe, and imports. Using technical model characteristics, such -as the
fact that the quantity supplied must equal the quantity demanded in
equilibrium, Landes and Posner correctly show in the technical appendix
to their paper that the elasticity of demand for a dominant firm depends
nize, as is explained more fully in the text, that their analysis depends on the product being perfectly
homogeneous. Second, they recognize that their approach may encourige domestic firms to raise
prices to a level (perhaps above profit. maximizing monopoly levels) that attracts some imports so
that the market is treated as international antitrust enforcers. See id. at 965 & n.46. ,
59. They back away from this requirement at times. In particular, they criticize Areeda and
Turner for viewing the simultaneous presence of imports and exports as indicating that a product is
sufficiently differentiated that it would be inappropriate to include foreign production in the market.
In their words:
[Tlhe existence of some differences across brands does not warrant the exclusion from the
market of distant sellers who have proved their ability to overcome the barriers of trans-
portation costs and tariffs, especially since the producer of one brand of a product can often
tailor the brand to the slightly different preferences of foreign consumers ....
Id. at 970.
60. Id. at 965. Although Landes and Posner do not discuss homogeneity extensively, homoge-
neity must apply to both the product itself and to the distribution of the product. This may'be a
formidable requirement.
61. Id. at 967. This makes sense since transitory imports are less likely to reflect an infrastruc-
ture that can support additional supplies.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Brennan, supra note 48, at 1854-55 (wherein he states that Landes and Posner's
approach understates the elasticity of supply of foreign producers).
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on the market elasticity of demand, the elasticity of supply of domestic
fringe competitors, and the elasticity of supply of foreign fringe competi-
tors. Moreover, under conditions Landes and Posner explicitly or im-
plicitly assume, it is also true that the elasticity of supply of foreign
competitors will equal or exceed the elasticity of supply of domestic
fringe competitors. However, this is not a robust result, since the relative
elasticities of supply depend on the assumptions one makes about pro-
duction and distribution costs in the U.S. and abroad, foreign demand
conditions, and the competitive behavior of firms in foreign markets.
64
In addition, by recognizing the presence of costs not reflected in the
model above, such as different distribution costs in the U.S. and abroad,
it is possible to generate examples where the elasticity of supply of a for-
eign producer is low and less than the elasticity of supply of the domestic
fringe. For example, if there are economies of scale in distribution and
the foreign firm supplies less to the U.S. market than the domestic fringe,
its marginal cost of supplying additional units will be larger. This higher
marginal cost may make the foreign supplier somewhat less responsive to
increases in U.S. prices than the domestic fringe.
The possibility of differences in distribution costs appears to be most
likely if there is clear evidence that the foreign manufacturer uses a dif-
ferent distribution system and that the distribution system used by the
foreign producer operates most efficiently at a smaller scale than the dis-
tribution system used by U.S. producers. For example, it might be that
the foreign producer relies on third party distributors who handle numer-
ous products, while domestic producers have their own distributors.
To this point we have followed Landes and Posner's lead in consid-
ering the results of comparative static analysis of trade in homogeneous
products. However, actual imports that are observed typically are differ-
entiated and occur in a dynamic world that admits strategies which are
not well captured by simple static models. When these more dynamic
and strategic considerations are recognized, an unambiguous finding that
the supply elasticity of the foreign fringe will necessarily be higher than
the domestic fringe's supply elasticity becomes even more problematic.
For example, if there are non-recoverable costs associated with ex-
panding shipments to market A, then there must be some prospect that
the price increase will last long enough to allow the firm to recover these
costs. 65 Since price responses by domestic firms may be quick, sunk costs
64. See the appendix to this paper for an example of how somewhat different assumptions can
alter the Landes and Posner conclusions.
65. For a more general discussion of why markets may not be contestable if the response lag by
the established firms is short relative to the time needed to recoup the (possibly small) sunk costs, see
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may be nontrivial, and established foreign demand and supply patterns
may have to be disrupted in order to serve the U.S. market, there is a
potentially sizeable risk involved in diverting supplies from foreign mar-
kets to the U.S. market. Among the costs associated with product diver-
sion are reputation costs, which may make it hard for foreign suppliers to
attract customers in the U.S. In particular, a customer's production and
inventory costs may increase with less stable supply relationships, which
may discourage customers from turning to less reliable foreign
producers.
66
Contractual arrangements between foreign producers and foreign
buyers may limit diversions directly. Even if such arrangements do not
currently exist, any history of sudden withdrawals of supplies to foreign
buyers might be expected to result in pressure for contracts that guaran-
tee supply in the future, vertical integration by foreign buyers, or foreign
government pressures to halt the diversions.
Turning to differentiation, U.S. markets may be characterized by
mobility barriers. That is, foreign products may have captured a particu-
lar segment of the market, but they may not be effective substitutes for
U.S. products in other segments of the market. Thus, U.S. prices in the
differentiated segment may have considerable leeway before foreign prod-
ucts would be regarded as substitutes.
Lastly, strategic considerations may play some role if U.S. firms are
the main potential entrants in the foreign markets and the foreign firms
are the primary potential entrants in the U.S. markets. Indeed, many
licensing agreements contain clauses designed to limit such competitive
geographic incursions. The threat of protectionist legislation or litigation
may be equally effective in encouraging restraint in exporting to the U.S.
In summary, foreign producers and domestic fringe suppliers often
can increase their supplies to a market in response to a price increase in
that market. Foreign suppliers, because they often can divert output
from other areas as well as increase their output, may add more output in
response to a price increase than domestic fringe suppliers. However,
neither of these general statements is valid in all cases. Clearly, when
cost curves differ because of different input costs or production functions,
the supply responses can be quite different for the domestic fringe and
the foreign producers. In fact, it is possible that a domestic fringe firm
will increase its supplies to the market in response to a price increase,
Schwartz, The Nature and Scope of Contestability Theory, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 37 (Supp.
1986).
66. The way in which a product is used in a subsequent production process will affect the extent
to which a manufacturer can rely on inputs from several different sources.
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while a foreign fringe firm will not, or that neither will. As a result,
economic theory alone can not resolve how foreign producers should be
treated in the analysis of the relevant geographic market.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN COMPETITION
While our discussion of the Landes and Posner extension of the
traditional approach to geographic market definition suggests that the
assumptions underlying their proposal may not apply in all circum-
stances, it does not indicate that their approach is not a valuable rule of
thumb. Only empirical testing can reveal the extent to which additional
imports will flow into the U.S. if U.S. producers try to raise prices above
competitive levels.
Two approaches suggest themselves. One relies on using historical
price data to estimate import demand elasticities. A second explores how
import levels have changed in response to changes in the value of the
dollar (and thus relative prices). We explore both empirical approaches
here.
A. Estimates of Import Price Elasticity for Various Industries
Economists have tried to estimate import price elasticities in aggre-
gate and in a number of more narrowly defined industries. A wide range
of import price elasticities have been reported. Indeed, both elastic (elas-
ticity greater than one) and inelastic (elasticity less than one) demand
have been observed. Estimates of long-run elasticities of demand for im-
ports of manufacturers into the United States based on industry-specific
data from the 1950s and 1960s, are summarized by Stern, Francis, and
Schumacher. 67 The best estimates of elasticities from this period suggest
a wide range: -.55 (paper) to -5.26 (rubber).
More recent estimates, incorporating data up to 1978, have been
presented by Sheills, Stern, and Deardorf.68 These recent studies also
produce a wide range of estimated elasticities. The import price elasticity
estimates for the earlier and later studies are shown in Table 1.
The empirical elasticity estimates shown in Table 1 are, we believe,
reason to reject unquestioning and universal application of the Landes-
Posner approach. There are many industry groups in which imports do
67. R. STERN, J. FRANCIS, & B. SCHUMACHER, PRICE ELASTICITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 15-17 (1976).
68. Sheills, Stem & Deardorf, Estimates of Elasticities of Substitution Between Imports and





















331 Wood prod., excl.
furniture
332 Furn. & Fixt., excl.
metal
341 Paper & paper
prod:
342 Printing & publ.
351 Industrial chem.
352 Other chem. prod.
353 Petroleum
refineries
354 Mis. prod., (n.e.c.)
































































356 Plastic prod., n.e.c.
361 Pottery, china, &
earth
362 Glass & prod.
369 Other non-met.
min. prod.
371 Iron steel bas. ind.
372 Non-ferr. met. bas.
ind.





4 -3.13 to -6
..a. n.a.
3 - 1.03 to - 4.6
1 -1.60
.a. n.a.
2 -. 85 to -- 2
3 -. 45 to -1.5
4 -. 67 to -3.8
7 -. 84 to -3.2
















384 Transport 4 -2.34 to -6 -3.28 -1.24
Equipment
385 Prof., photog. 1 -1.08 -1.08 -0.44
goods, etc.
389 Other manuf. ind. 7 -. 09 to -3.77 -2.06 -2.37
not apparently surge in response to domestic price increases in the U.S.
in the long-run. Moreover, since short-run elasticities are lower than
long-run elasticities, the long-run elasticities typically shown in Table 1
may overstate the elasticity of supply of imports over the shorter time
period used in most antitrust market definition tests.
69
B. Exchange Rate Elasticity Estimates
The Landes and Posner proposal suggests that events that tend to
raise the prices charged by U.S. domestic producers will precipitate
enough imports to defeat the effort'to raise prices. The rapid increases in
the value of the dollar through 1985 should have been perceived by im-
porters in much the same way as monopolistic price increases. As with a
monopolistic price increase, an increase in the value of the dollar (a rise
in the exchange rate) is an event of uncertain duration70 which increases
the price foreign producers obtain from selling their products in the U.S.
As a result, an increase in the value of the dollar should create incentives
for foreign producers to increase their imports to the U.S. which are sim-
ilar to those created by monopolistic price increases.
Translating the Landes-Posner view into terms that relate to
changes in the exchange rate, their theory predicts that substantial
changes in imports and import shares should appear in industries when
exchange rates change substantially. 7' Exchange rate fluctuations have
been substantial, and to a large extent unexpected, in recent years. This
69. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines recommend a one year period.
70. We suspect that changes in the exchange rate may be viewed as more predictable and likely
to be sustained longer than many monopolistic price increases. If this is the case, then the elasticity
of supply of imports for a change in the exchange rate probably exceeds that for a monopolistic price
increase, since importers will have a shorter period to recoup entry/expansion costs in the case of a
monopolistic price increase. For a discussion of how "hit and run" entry is discouraged by a short-
ening of the response time of established firms (represented here by the time before the value of the
dollar falls in the case of exchange rates), see Schwartz & Reynolds, Contestable Markets: An Upris-
ing in the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 488 (1983).
71. Previous research has addressed related issues. For example, researchers have investigated
the relationship between the profitability of U.S. firms and the level of imports. Articles in this
tradition include Esposito & Esposito, Foreign Competition and Domestic Industry Profitability, 53
REV. ECON. & STATIsTIcs 343 (1971), and Marvel, Foreign Trade and Domestic Competition, 18
EcON. INQUIRY 103 (1980). Research in this area has generally concluded that trade does discipline
U.S. profit rates to some extent, but that growth in demand is a much more significant factor.
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facilitates the analysis. 72 First, it makes the resulting change in prices
more closely parallel to the change that would result from a monopolistic
price increase. Second, it allows us to focus on sizeable price changes
that occur during a brief period when other factors are less likely to have
changed so much that they confound the analysis.
We have developed some crude measures of the sensitivity of im-
ports for industries to changes in exchange rates. 73 The increase in the
value of the dollar between 1980 and 1981 provides a large and rapid
enough -increase in the value of the dollar to meet the Justice Department
Merger Guidelines hypothetical, so the analysis will focus on this pe-
riod.74 In this analysis, two import trade penetration measures are used.
The first is the ratio of imports to U.S. production. (U.S. supply is total
U.S. production plus imports.) This will be termed the gross import pen-
etration. The second measure is the net import penetration ratio. This is
calculated as imports minus exports divided by U.S. production. The
export data for this measure were gathered from the TSUSA export data
and concorded to the output four digit industries. The import data were
also concorded to this basis.
For our exchange rate-elasticity study, import data were obtained
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor's trade monitoring project. This unpub-
lished data base contains information on imports at the four digit level
for 1975 to 1981. Among import data sets, it is fairly unique in the
amount of effort devoted to tracing changes in import codes to provide
consistent import summaries. The exchange rate used in the study is the
multilateral trade-weighted value of the dollar as calculated by the Fed-
eral Reserve. To allow for lags in the response of imports to changes in
the exchange rate, changes in imports during 1981 are compared to the
changes in exchange rate between 1980 and 1981.
These import elasticity measures do not include consideration of
72. For a similar interpretation of exchange rate changes, see Feinberg, Interaction of Foreign
Exchange and Market Power Effect on German Domestic Prices, 35 J. INDUS. EcON. 61 (1986).
73. There have been many studies in the international trade literature attempting to estimate
the impact of currency changes on a country's overall balance of trade or balance of payments. These
studies are not directly related to our interest in the response of imports to a domestic price increase
because changes in the balance of trade reflect the combined effects of a change in the physical
quantity of exports and imports and a change in the value of the currency in which the trade balance
is measured. Nevertheless a number of these studies, which argue that devaluation of a country's
currency may not improve the balance of payments, at least in the short run, suggest that the re-
sponse of imports to changes in the value of a country's currency may be relatively slow. See, e.g..
Brillembourg, Purchasing Power Parity and the Balance of Payments: Some Empirical Evidence, 24
INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 77 (1977).
74. The real multilateral trade-weighted value of the dollar rose from an index level of 84.8 to




price changes by domestic firms (which will bias our elasticities down-
ward if U.S. firms raise prices in response to higher import prices and
upward if U.S. firms follow the less likely strategy of lowering prices in
response to the increase dollar price of imports). In addition, these esti-
mates do not accommodate lags in trade adjustments in a particularly
sophisticated way. Exchange rates for individual currencies may differ
from the average exchange rates that were used and trade with these
countries may be concentrated in a subset of products.75 Finally, income
elasticities of demand are not considered separately. In short, the
"crude" import elasticity measures simply reflect trade flow changes dur-
ing a historical period when domestic prices were likely to be rising rap-
idly compared to import prices. Nonetheless, given the rapid change in
prices, we think the results are worth reporting since it is unlikely that
adjusting for all these factors would alter the general findings
significantly.
As the results in Table 2 indicate, the percentage change in the value
of imports was often less than the percentage change in the exchange
rate, suggesting that in many industries there was not a surge of imports
in response to the relative increase in U.S. prices even in industries where
imports were already present. Indeed, in several industries which we did
not select for inclusion in Table 2, there was an absolute decline in im-
ports. 76 Moreover, the elasticities reported in the third column of Table
2 suggest that there is significant variation in import elasticities of supply
across industries.
75. See Kercheval, Another Look at the Dollar's Trade-Weighted Value, 12 Bus. ECON. 43
(1987).
76. Some examples are provided in the following table:
Industry SIC Industry
2011 Meat Packing Plants
2331 Women's, Misses', & Junior's Blouses, Waists & Shirts
2611 Pulp Mills
2721 Periodicals: Publishing, or Publishing & Printing
3021 Rubber & Plastics Footwear
3111 Leather Tanning & Finishing
3554 Paper Industries Machinery
3563 Air & Gas Compressors








2211 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton
2221 Broadwoven Fabric Mills,
Manmade Fiber & Silk
2283 Yarn Mills, Wool Including
Carpet & Rug Yarn
2386 Leather & Sheep Lined Clothing
2643 Bags, Except Textile Bags
2654 Sanitary Food Containers




2841 Soap & Other Detergents, Except
Specialty Cleaners
2842 Specialty Cleaning, Polishing, &
Sanitation Preparations
2844 Perfumes, Cosmetics, & Other
Toilet Preparations
2879 Pesticides & Agricultural
Chemicals, Not Elsewhere
Classified
3316 Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet, Strip &
Bars
3331 Primary Smelting & Refining of
Copper
3334 Primary Production of
Aluminum
3411 Metal Cans
3494 Valves & Pipe Fittings, Except
Plumbers Brass Goods
3541 Machine Tools, Metal Cutting
types














































3645 Residential Electric Lighting 0.05 -2.06
Fixtures
3724 Aircraft Engines & Engine Parts 1.30 -1.80
3728 Aircraft Parts & Auxiliary 3.07 0.46
Equipment, Not Elsewhere
Classified
3843 Dental Equipment & Supplies 0.56 0.69
V. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical findings in the previous section, in addition to our
earlier theoretical discussion, should suggest some caution in expanding
geographic markets in such a way as to incorporate foreign production or
capacity in amounts substantially greater than the actual amounts of im-
ports that have entered the U.S. Moreover, even if empirical studies
show a significant degree of "import elasticity," it is important to recall
that changes in exchange rates, in a direction that make imports more
expensive, can take place rapidly and to a degree that would reverse the
import-generating effect of a modest increase in the domestic price level.
In addition, actions of a political nature, either at home (such as higher
tariffs or quotas) or abroad (such as "voluntary" restrictions on exports
to the U.S.), can also dramatically undermine the restraint to the exercise
of domestic market power that imports may have offered.
77
At the same time, we are not suggesting that the correct policy is to
ignore the imports altogether. However, precisely how to shape these
uncertainties into a concrete recommendation is a task of some difficulty.
In part, this is because the "right" answer depends on one's assessment of
the costs associated with error. This is most easily illustrated in the
merger context. Those who believe that horizontal mergers have a
strong potential for creating efficiencies and that domestic concentration
is unlikely to result in monopoly pricing regardless of the degree of im-
ports will wish to "tilt" the analysis of import competition to downplay
the concern that imports may not always be forthcoming in response to a
domestic price increase. Those who are less sanguine about the societal
benefits of horizontal mergers, and are more concerned that higher do-
77. For contrasting views on how to deal with these uncertainties, see Baker, Market Definition
and International Competition," 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 377 (1983) (arguing that these uncer-
tainties should cause us to discount the significance of foreign competition) and 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 35, at 362-63 (arguing that foreign imports should not be treated differently
because of political factors involving domestic and foreign tariff and trade policy). See also Remarks
Delivered by Terry Calvani, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 22, 1987), printed as
The Uncertainties of International Geographic Markets, 32 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV.
93 (1988).
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mestic concentration would, in the absence of imports, result in noncom-
petitive pricing, are more likely to attach a significant weight to the
possibility that economic or political factors will eliminate the threat of
imports and thus will want to define markets more narrowly to minimize
the chances of permitting what might turn out to be a noncompetitive
merger.
78
There is no question that foreign competition can exercise a signifi-
cant restraint on the exercise of market power by domestic firms. There
is also no question that the traditional approaches will often underesti-
mate the significance of foreign competition by concentrating on histori-
cal snapshots of the degree of foreign competition and failing to take into
account the added incentive provided to foreign firms of any attempt by
domestic firms actually to exercise market power. However, the ap-
proaches that have been suggested to deal with this problem carry with
them the possibility of overstating the degree to which foreign competi-
tion can be depended upon in any given instance. We can only suggest
that policymakers consider carefully their own degree of risk-aversion
along with the theoretical and empirical analysis we have offered in de-
ciding how to deal with the question of the significance to attach to the
potential for foreign competition.
78. Similar conclusions can be expressed about the desirability of defining markets narrowly in
a Section 2 context. Those who tend to see efficiency-creation in the actions of large firms will be less




To illustrate the lack of robustness in the Landes and Posner result,
consider a market in which the foreign producer that supplies imports to
the U.S. has market power in its home market (which is protected by
barriers to entry, such as quotas) and price discriminates between the
U.S. and its home market. Figure 1 illustrates this case. In this figure,
MC represents the marginal cost of production for the foreign firm and
the domestic fringe. DB and MRB represent the demand and marginal
revenue curves faced by the foreign firm in its home market, and P°A
represents the initial market price the foreign firm faces in market A
(perhaps in the U.S.).
FIGURE 1
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If P°A > MRB at the monopoly output level for serving market B
alone,79 then the foreign firm will serve both markets.80 Maximization of
joint profits in markets A and B requires that PA=MRB=MC.81 PA
79. Since monopoly output is determined by setting MR, equal to MC, this requires P"A to lie
above MR,, at the point where the MR, and MC curves cross, which is true in Figure 1.
80. This also assumes the PA is less than the vertical intercept of the foreign demand curve.
81. For example, if PA > MR,,, then the firm would gain by diverting output from B to A. If PA
or MR,, were less than MC, then the firm would gain from reducing output, since the incremental
costs of producing output exceed the incremental revenues the firm gets from the output.
1988]
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equals MRB at F, so the firm supplies OF to market B at a price P°B.
Since PA equals MC at C, the firm supplies FC to Market A. The total
output supplied by the foreign firm is thus OC. A domestic (market A)
fringe firm with costs MC facing a market price of P0A would also pro-
duce OC, but all of this output would be supplied to market A.
A price increase in market A from P0A to PA will cause the foreign
firm to cut its sales to market B to OE. An amount, EF, will be diverted
from market B to market A. In addition, the foreign firm will increase
its output by CD which will all be sold in market A. As a result, it will
supply ED to market A-which is EF + CD greater than the amount it
sold in A before the price increase. In contrast, a domestic fringe in A
with the same costs will only increase its output by CD in response to the
same increase in price.
From Figure 1, one sees that both because of the possibility of diver-
sion (EF) and the lower initial level of supply of market A by the foreign
firm (FC < OC) that the elasticity of supply of the foreign fringe in A is
likely to exceed that of the domestic fringe. This is the basic Landes-
Posner result.
The Landes and Posner result is not particularly general. By modi-
fying the basic demand, cost, and competitive conditions facing the for-
eign firm, one can construct cases in which foreign supply is less
responsive to changes in domestic prices than. domestic fringe producers.
Foreign firms will not always find it profitable to divert products
from their home market to export markets in response to a price increase
in foreign markets. For example, if we alter the competitive structure of
market B, so that the foreign firm faces rival competitors that limit its
ability to raise its price in its home market to PL, then the foreign firm
will supply OL to market B both before and after the price increase in
area A. 82 This change means that there will be no diversion of output
from B to A, so both the domestic fringe and the foreign competitor will
increase their supply to market A by CD. While the elasticity of supply
of the foreign fringe is still greater than the elasticity of supply of the
domestic fringe, since the initial supply level of the foreign fringe is less
(LC < OC), the quantity added to the market and thus the price effects of
the additional supply from the two sources will be the same.
83
Changes in the foreign producer's production costs can further re-
82. One would observe this type of behavior if the foreign producer has been following a policy
of limit pricing in its home market.
83. Again, this agrees with the Landes and Posner result, since this means that the fringe firms'
market share may overstate the domestic fringe's importance relative to the importer, since the im-
porter's share of market A will be smaller.
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duce its responsiveness to a domestic price increase. This can be visual-
ized by looking at Figure 1 and noticing that if a foreign producer had a
steeper marginal cost curve, its curve would cut PA to the left of D.
Thus, if the foreign firm faced a limit price PL, and had steeper costs, the
quantity response for the foreign producer could be less than that of the
domestic fringe. 84 In particular, if the foreign producer faced a capacity
constraint that caused its marginal cost curve to go up vertically at point
C, the foreign supplier's elasticity of supply would be zero, and thus less
than the domestic fringe's elasticity of supply.
84. It may be that its supply response relative to its previous sales in market A is still larger
than domestic firms.
1988]

